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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appeal by the Defendant, Colleen
Mickey, from a decision denying her motion
for mistrial and from her conviction of
the crime of possession for sale of a stimulant drug and the judgment connnitting her
to the Utah State Prison.
1.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Second Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Weber, State of Utah, after
trial before a jury, sentenced the Defendant
to a term in the Utah State Prison upon her
conviction of the crime of possession for sale
of a stimulant drug.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the
conviction and judgment thereon and an order
directing the case be remanded to the District
Court for a resentencing consistent with the
crime of possession.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 30, 1971, Philip Roche, an
police officer for the Ogden City
Police Department, and Gary Spangler, a police
2.

informer, went to an apartment in Ogden
occupied by a Mrs. Nelson.

'111e Defendant

Colleen Mickey, was visiting Mrs. Nelson
at theapartment.
to the Defendant.

'

Mr. Spangler was known
Officer Roche was not.

Officer Roche testified that Gary Spangler
asked the Defendant if she had any "grass"
and that they both asked her if she would
sell them any "speed" !

The officer testi-

fied that he purchased five dollars worth
of the amphetamines from the Defendant
and that he observed Gary Spangler make a
one dollar purchase from her.

(R. 62-66)

Mrs. Mickey was charged with the crime of
unlawfully possessing for sale a stimulant
drug, to-wit:

Amphetamine. (R. 60)

Colleen Mickey took the stand and
3.

testified that she began using amphetamines
to control her weight when she was eight years
old and was then a user of amphetamines and that
she had had them in her possession for personal
use only.

(R. 128)

She stated that she con-

sidered Gary Spangler to be a personal friend
and that, on the occasion in issue, she gave
him some pills because he told her he needed
a "fix".

(R. 129)

According to Mrs. Mickey,

Officer Roche persistently requested her to
sell him pills but she refused.

After she gave

Gary Spangler the pills, Officer Roche handed
him a five dollar bill.

Mr. Spangler offered

this bill to the Defendant and when she refused
it, he pressed it on her stating, "No, go

ahead, I might not have it next time if I need
any pills or if you need any pills ••• Take it

4.

now."

(R. 130)

Mrs. Mickey specifically

declined that her possession of the pills
was with an intent to sell them.

(R. 128)

Mrs. Mickey's testimony was corroborated in its essentials by that of Mrs. Nelson.

She testified that Spangler had told

the Defendant that he was "really hurting"
and that the Defendant was reluctant to give
him any pills because she did not have enough
for herself.

According to Mrs. Nelson the

Defendant finally agreed, stating that she
was doing so because of their long friendship.
Mrs. Nelson agreed that there had been no
mention of money by either party.

(R. 105)

She also testified that it was common practice among users, such as herself, to share
pills with a friend so that they could them-

5.

selves obtain pills by reciprocation.

Also,

that sometimes a person so obtaining the pills
would reimburse the giver with their cost rather
than replacing the pills themselves.

(R. 110)

The State did not call Gary Spangler as
a witness and he could not be found to testify
for the defense.
The defense moved that the Court take
the case from the jury and convict Mrs. Mickey
of mere possession of the drug as there·had
been no showing of possession with intent to
sell.

This motion was denied.

(R. 158)

During his final argument, the attorney
for the State, Robert Neeley, stated his personal
belief in Officer Roche's testimony (R. 145)
and that he thought it entirely probable that
Colleen Mickey would sell drugs.
6.

(R. 144)

He

further stated that the number of pills that
Mrs. Mickey testified she took daily was
an excessive number and that· such an amount
would be likely to cause death.
145)

(R. 144-

There was no evidence in the record

to support his statement.

He further appeaed

to the fears of the jurors as citizens and
parents by telling them as follows:
"It is left up to you. You are the
only people that can find this Defendant guilty, and I ask you to do
that. • • I ask you to think of the
boys and girls out there in classes
in junior high school and the girls
and boys even in grade school. • • "
(R. 156)
At this point the defense objected
to the type of argument and the Judge told
the prosecutor that he had gone beyond the
rebuttal stage.

(R. 156-7)
7.

Despite the

Judge's caution, the prosecutor continued in
the same vein, telling the jurors that it
could have been a young girl or boy who had

gone to theapartment that day rather than the
officer and that they had an obligation to
the coumunity to convict the Defendant because
of the danger to young persons.

(R. 157)

The defense moved for a mistrial on the
basis that the prosecutor's remarks were prejudicial.

The motion was denied.

(R. 158)

Colleen Mickey was convicted as charged
and was committed to the Utah State Prison to
serve a term of up to ten years (R. 47).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING THE CHARGE IN THE INFORMATION FROM POS8.

SESSION WITH INTENT TO SELL TO POSSESSION.
The record is clear that Mrs. Mickey
was in possession of the drugs as alleged.
However, virtually all evidence pointed to
one conclusion - that she possessed the
drug for her own use to control obesity and
personal use as an addict.

It is the position of the Defendant that ·
as a matter of law the evidence was not suff icient to go to the jury on the question

of possession with the intent to sell and that
to allow it constituted reversible error.
Defense counsel's motion for the Court to
take the case from the jury as there had
been no showing of intent to sell should have
been granted, and the Court should have therein entered a finding of guilt as to the lesser
9.

I

included offense of possession as requested.
(R. 158)

It is necessary in a case wherein !.2!,cific intent is an element of the crime charged
for the State to prove such specific intent as
an independent fact.

Ogelsby v. State, 411

P.2d 974 (Okl. Cr., 1966).

The Oklahoma Court

of Criminal Appeals relied upon the rule sta.ted
in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 32 at page 117,
as follows:
"A specific criminal intent is not presumed, and conviction cannot be had on
the basis of imputed intent. The general rule, stated infra Sec. 34, that a
criminal intention will be presumed
from the commission of the unlawful act
does not apply. No intent in law or
mere legal presumption, differing from
the intent in fact, can be allowed to
supply the place of proof of the requisite specific intent."
Clearly the transaction was made at the
10.

initiative of the police officer and his
agent and was not the product of Defendant's
intention or desire.

A criminal sanction

cannot be imposed if the disposition to
conunit a crime is implanted in the mind of '
the person not otherwise disposed to commit an offense.
287

Sorrells v. United States,

U.S. 435 (1932).
Where the evidence discloses that a

sale of drugs was made at the request of
a police officer or agent as in this case,
entrapment is established as a matter of
law unless there is also evidence of prior
sales, large inventory, or other evidence
which would indicate a predisposition to
sell.

In such cases the burden of proof

is on the prosecution to show the existence
11.

of the predisposition to•sell.

In the case at

Bar all evidence clearly refutes any predisposition to sell.

The police officers went to an

apartment without invitation.

The Defendant

happened to be at the apartment as a guest.
The officer and his informer first asked to buy
"grass", and when that was denied them, asked
to buy "speed".

Gary v. State, 231 N.E

2d 793 (Ind., 1967), an appeal from a conviction for the sale of heroin.

There police offi·

cers, in cooperation with an informant, had gom
to the Defendant's house, asked the Defendant tc
sell heroin, and effected a sale.

Except for

the single sale made at the request of the

in-

formant, the State offered no evidence as to
prior sales, large inventory, or other factors
which would indicate the Defendant was in the
business of selling narcotics.
12.

In revers-

ing the conviction, the Supreme Court of
Indiana reasoned:
"Where the evidence shows • • • that
there was a plan devised by law enforcement officers to reveal a violation of the criminal law and such
law enforcement officers participate
actively in the transaction which is
declared to be illegal . • • There must
be in such instances evidence which
will rebut that the illegal transaction
was induced solety by the plan of the
law enforcement officers, since the
burden of proof is on the State and
does not shift to the defendant. The
evidence must show that the illegal
transaction was actually
of the
appellant and not that of the law
enforcement officials or informers
who was acting at the instigation of
the law enforcement officials.
Here we have no evidence whatever that
this appellant, before he was approached
by this informant, had been engaged in
the sale of heroin or that he had any
intent to make a sale before he was
asked to do so by a plan of law enforcement officers . • • If law enforcement
officers use a scheme or plan to disclose illegal activities of one charged
13.

with a crime, then they must also bring
forward evidence to show that that party
was not innocently lured and enticed to
corranit the illegal act." 231 N.E.2d at
796.

The degree of persuasion used by law enforcement officials is not significant where
the first approach is made by the law and
where there is no evidence of predisposition.
United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 196
(3rd Cir., 1957).

Even if the degree of per-

suasion were an issue in this case, the entire
evening's activities were initiated by law
enforcement officers and disclose that the Defendant was pressured into making a gift or sale
of marijuana or amphetamines to Officer Roche
and/or agent Gary Spangler.
In this case the charge was not selling
1

a controlled substance but possessing a controlled

14.

substance with the intent to sell it.
In an attempt to show this intent, the police officer and his agent solicited a drug
transfer to them which they hoped could be
characterized as a sale.

Without further

evidence of predisposition, as discussed
above, this evidence, even if concluded to
be a sale, would not support a conviction
for selling a controlled substance.

As a

matter of law, a transfer to a police officer made at his request and not supported
by other evidence as to predisposition, is
not sufficient to show the purpose for which
Mrs. Mickey possessed the amphetamine pills
and thus the State failed to meet its burden
with respect to the element of intent.

The

defense's motion to withdraw the case from
15.

the jury and find the Defendant guilty of

simple possession should have been granted.

POINT 2

THE CLOSING ARGUMENT BY THE PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL AND CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A.

IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL

FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO EXPRESS HIS

PERSONAL BELIEF AS TO RELIABILITY OF WITNESSES.
It is improper for a prosecuting attorney
to express his personal belief as to the relia-

hility of a witness.

E.g., People v. Roberts,

SS Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 P.2d 420 (1966).
1

The

record reflects such impropriety at page 145,

' as

follows:
"I would submit to you that Officer Roche
told you the truth when he got up there,
an officer of the law, a man that you pay
16.

his monthly salary to, a man who laid
hif life on the line when he does his
job as an undercover agent. I would
submit to you that he told you that
he told you the truth when he said:
'I received five dollars directly.'
I would submit to you that he is telling you the truth when he said that
Gary Spangler gave her a dollar and she
gave him some drugs."
To allow a prosecuting attorney to
submit his personal belief on the reliability
of a witness is to allow him to usurp the function of the jury as ultimate trier of fact.
In United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371
(5th Cir. 1972), the Court was faced with
similar comments and reversed the conviction
because such statements implied that the prosecutor has additional information or reasons
for believing a witness has told the truth
than have been disclosed to the jury.
17.

It is particularly prejudicial in the case at

Bar because of the paucity of corroborated
testimony on which the jury is to make its decision.

Officer Roche's testimony was entirely

uncorroborated.

The State failed to call the

informant to testify and mocked defense counsel's
request to produce him.

(R. 156)

If the State

can further embellish the sole witness' testi, mony by the prosecutor's opinion, the Defendant
is denied a fair trial.

B.

IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL

·FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO COMMENT ON

MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE.
Argument by counsel is limited to the
issues in the trial and to matters in evidence.

E.g., Cole v. State, 175 P.2d 376 (1946); Sykes
L State, 238 P.2d 384 (Okl. Cr., 1951).

18.

In

the instant case the prosecutor stated "She
even had the audacity to tell you that she
takes 400 pills a day

• • That is an aw-

ful lot of those things to have to swallow •

..•

I don't see now how anybody can take

400 pills of that trash and can be still alive
to day. • • "

(R. 144-l45)

The prosecution in

effect, testified as to the normal usage of
a drug user and the medical effect of the
quantity of the drug which the Defendant
stated she used daily.

There was no testi-

mony by a sworn witness to either of these
matters and there can be no doubt as to the
impropriety of these statements.
C.

IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDI-

CIAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO INFER TO THE
JURORS THAT, IF COMMITTED, THE DEFENDANT
19.

WOULD RECEIVE MEDICAL TREATMENT RATHER TIIAN
PUNISHMENT.

After inferring that the daily dosage

claimed by Mrs. Mickey was lethal, the prosecui

tor then went on to state that Mrs. Mickey
". . . needs to be put away somewhere.
needs some kind of help.

She

I don't know if it

is medical help or what, but she is in dire
need of help."

(R. 146)

From this unwarranted

statement the jurors easily could have believed
l

that they should convict Colleen Mickey, regardless of whether or not she was in fact guilty,

in order to keep her off drugs and perhaps save
!

her life.

In essence, they could easily have

concluded that she would benefit from a conviction.

The jurors might well have believed that,

since the prosecutor considered Mrs. Mickey to
20.

be in "dire need of help" that she would
not be sent to prison but would be treated
instead.
For the prosecution to lead the jurors
to believe that the Defendant, if convicted ,
would not be severely punished, is to lessen
in the jurors minds the need for them to be
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
in order to convict.

Referring to the pos-

sibilities of probation or parole.have frequently been held to be improper and prejudicial.

People v. Hillery, 401 P.2d 382

(Cal. 1965); In re Imbler, 393 P.2d 687 (Cal.
1964).

The same rationale should apply here.

D.

IT WAS IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL

FOR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO APPEAL TO THE
EMOTIONS OF THE JURORS BY SPECULATING ON
21.

MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PREJUDICING THE JURY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
AND TO AROUSE IN THE JURORS A FEAR OF PUBLIC

1

DISAPPROVAL.

In his argument to the jury the State's
attorney made a long and emotional appeal to
the jurors to convict Colleen Mickey because
of the threat of drugs to young people in the

:. coIIUDunity.

In State v. White, 144 S. E. 2d 401,

the prosecutor urged the jurors to envision
their own female relatives in the place of the
rape victim.

The conviction was reversed.

In

the instant case the appeal was equally offensive.

l
1

I
I

•

The prosecutor stated:
"I ask you to think of the boys and girls
out there in classes in high school and
the boys and girls out there in classes
in junior high school and the girls and
boys even in grade school ••• ! (R. 156)
22.

Even when defense counsel objected
and the Court admonished the prosecutor,
he continued:
''Very well, but I would submit to you
that it can very well happen that
there was a young girl or boy that
had knocked on that door that day
instead of an officer of the law, and
I think you have an obligation to
uphold in this community. Now I have
done the best I know how, and it's
in yours hands now, and I ask ·you to
find the Defendant guilty. I ask you
to uphold your stage in this community." (R. 157)
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed for similar conduct in Lime v.
State, 479 P.2d 608 (1971).

There the pro-

secutor told the jurors that the Defendant
would kill again if they acquitted and that
the jurors would be responsible if he did.
Certainly the clear implication of Mr. Neeley's
23.

remarks is that, if acquitted, Mrs. Mickey
would be a threat to the children of the community in that she would sell them drugs.

Such comments are the equivalent of those found
to be reversible error in Lime.
In State v. Agner, Ohio App.2d 96, 283
N.E.2d 443, a conviction was reversed because
the prosecuting attorney called for a conviction to meet a public demand and not by reason

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Where could

' one find a better example of this type of impropriety than Mr. Neeley's final utterance to
the jury:
"I think you have an obligation to uphold
in this community. Now I have done the
best I know how, and it is in your hands
now, and I ask you to find the Defendant
guilty. I ask you to uphold your stake
in this community."

24.

is a classic example of an improper argument
for a prosecutor to make.

It is a well-

established rule of law that a prosecutor
may not indulge in argument calculated to
arouse in jurors fear of public disapproval, or of being regarded as recreant in
their duty, which on either account tends
to coerce jurors into a verdict of conviction.
The prosecutor's argument

State v.

Makal, 455 P.2d 450 (Ariz. 1969), was that
the Defendant was a danger to society and
should be convicted; thus implying, as the
Arizona Supreme Court found, that the jurors
should convict without regard to the issue
of insanity raised by the defense.

The fol-

lowing statement was part of that argument:
25.

" • • He is essentially dangerous to
other people; he is very dangerous to himself. We can't afford - society can't
afford to have Mr. Makal take the life
of any other innocent victims. Society
can't afford that." 455 P.2d at 452.

The case was reversed because of those improper
prejudicial statements.
The defense has here catalogued only the
most glaring examples of !mpropriety in the prosecutor's closing arguments.

Read as a whole,

the statement makes the prosecutor an unsworn
witness calling for a conviction to meet the
prosecutor's demand and not by reason of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The arguments are

replete with unwarranted statements and inflammatory language.

I

Whether or not any one such

statement was prejudicial to the Defendant is

I open to speculation.

However, this Court has
26.

long subscribed to the theory that where
there are a number of errors, no single
error considered alone needs to constitute
reversible error if the cumulative effect
of all errors is to deprive the Defendant
of a fair trial.

State v. Vasguez, 101

Utah 444 (1942); State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah
2d 230 (1955).

The Arizona Supreme Court

has taken the position that any doubt as to
whether or not such statements were in fact
prejudicial must be resolved in favor of the
Defendant and that the reviewing Court must
remand the case for a new trial or modify
the judgment or sentence to fit the needs
of justice.

Sykes v. State, supra.
CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully submits that
27.

the record supports Appellant's contention that
there was not sufficient evidence to allow the
charge to go to the jury and the Trial Court

1

erred in allowing the jury to speculate as to
whether Appellant's unlawful possession of the
stimulant drug was with the intent to sell or
was for her own personal use.

Appellant's mo-

tion that the Court take the issue from the jury
' and enter a finding of guilt as to unlawful
possession, a misdemeanor, should

been grante

Appellant's position is particularly persuasive in light of the numerous improprieties
indulged in by the prosecutor in his oral argument.
I
1

I

the

Where a jury is left to speculate as to

sufficiency of the State's evidence as they

were in this trial, the prosecutor must not be
allowed as an unsworn witness to resort to an
28.

open appeal to prejudice and then call for
a conviction to meet public demand and not
by reason of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The cumulative effect of these errors
deprived Appellant of a fair trial and it
would be manifestly unjust to allow the conviction to stand.

For these reasons, the

Appellant urges that this Honorable Court
reverse and remand this case.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MARSH
Counsel for Appellant
1018 First Security Bank
Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
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